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Mindfulness practice has been linked to reduced depressive rumination and described as
involving inhibition of information that has been relevant in the past and is no longer rele-
vant in the present moment. Backward inhibition (BI) is considered to be one of the purest
measures of task set inhibition, and impaired BI has been linked to depressive rumination.
BI was contrasted with Competitor Rule Suppression (CRS), which is another phenomenon
observed in task switching, yet one which involves episodic memory tagging of information
that is currently conflicting rather than active inhibition. Although similar at baseline level,
a randomly assigned group (n=38) who underwent an eight session mindfulness train-
ing program exhibited improved BI but not CRS compared to a waiting list group (n=38).
Findings indicate that mindfulness improves the specific component of task set inhibition,
which has previously been linked to reduced rumination. Implications regarding the poten-
tial role of task set inhibition in mediating between mindfulness and reduced rumination,
as well as the role of mindfulness in “being in the present moment” are discussed.
Keywords: mindfulness, backward inhibition, competitor rule suppression, task switching, mental set
INTRODUCTION
In a changing environment, the ability to inhibit thoughts and
actions which are no longer relevant is crucial for our everyday
functioning and well being. Impairments in such inhibition may
result in perseveration, being “stuck” in a certain way of thinking,
and responding inappropriately rather than adhering to the cur-
rent situation demands (Mayr and Keele, 2000). Responding to a
new situation or task requires deactivation of mindsets adopted
in the recent past in favor of the currently relevant mindsets (see
Koch et al., 2010).
In this paper we propose that mindfulness practice is a method
which may promote such inhibition. Mindfulness has been defined
as “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the
present moment and non-judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4).
Although various definitions and conceptualizations have been
proposed for mindfulness (see Chambers et al., 2009; Chiesa and
Malinowski, 2011; Chiesa and Serretti, 2011; Grossman and Van
Dam, 2011, for discussion), there is relative agreement that mind-
fulness involves both self regulation of attention to the present
moment, and an orientation of openness and acceptance toward
it. Such attendance to the present moment seems likely to involve
inhibition of past thoughts and representations (Bishop et al.,
2004).
Inhibition has been proposed to be one of the three cognitive
processes termed “executive functions,” with the other two being
mental set shifting and information updating and monitoring
(Miyake et al., 2000). These functions are considered to enable the
exertion of cognitive control and flexible adaptation, typically in
novel or otherwise highly demanding contexts. Participants under-
going mindfulness training exhibited equivalent performance to
control groups in a mental set shifting paradigm (Anderson et al.,
2007) and in an internal switching paradigm requiring both set
shifting and working memory updating (Chambers et al., 2008),
yet outperformed controls on a multiple perspective images task
requiring participants to switch between visual perspectives (Hod-
gins and Adair, 2010). Studies which have addressed the relation
between mindfulness and various processes which may involve the
component of inhibition have yielded an even more mixed pattern
of results (see Chiesa and Serretti, 2011). People undergoing mind-
fulness training have been shown to exhibit superior performance
relative to control groups on the Hayling task, requiring partici-
pants to complete sentences with unrelated and nonsensical words
(Heeren et al., 2009), verbal fluency (Heeren et al., 2009; Zeidan
et al., 2010), tasks requiring participants to respond to an arrow
pointing to either the same or opposite direction as flanking arrows
(Hodgins and Adair, 2010, in long term meditators; Tang et al.,
2007), and on the Einstellung water jar task, which examines the
degree to which participants are able to identify and utilize simple
and obvious solutions to problems following repeated experience
with a long and complex solving method (Greenberg et al., 2012).
Conversely, no differences were found between mindfulness prac-
titioners and control groups on other measures which may involve
inhibitory processes, such as the GoStop paradigm (Heeren et al.,
2009), and the continuous performance task (Cusens et al., 2010),
both of which require participants to withhold their response
whenever a certain signal appears. Additionally, findings regard-
ing the effect of mindfulness on Stroop interference have yielded
inconsistent results (see Anderson et al., 2007; Chan and Woolla-
cott, 2007, in long term meditators; Josefsson and Broberg, 2011,
in long term meditators; van den Hurk et al., 2010, in long term
meditators; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005).
The results described above make it difficult to draw clear
conclusions regarding the relation between mindfulness and inhi-
bition. One reason for this difficulty is the clear inconsistency of
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findings. More importantly, however, is that most if not all of
the above findings may be explained by various non-inhibitory
accounts such as episodic memory retrieval, persistent activa-
tion, resolution of conflict between various possible routes, and
rule guided algorithmic processing (see MacLeod et al., 2003;
Neill, 2007; Koch et al., 2010). For example, while the Stroop
effect has been linked to cognitive control and inhibition (Roelofs,
2003) it has also been described as the paradigmatic example for
automaticity (Tzelgov, 1997).
In this paper, we focus on the relation between mindfulness
practice and two measures related to task set suppression, which
are both identified within the same task switching paradigm.
An important advantage of the fact that the two measures are
taken from the same paradigm is that whatever differences are
found between them could not be attributed to superficial differ-
ences between paradigms. Critically, while one of the measures
taps active online inhibition of information that has been rele-
vant in the past but is no longer relevant, the other measure taps
(mostly) episodic tagging of currently competing information. We
will hereby briefly describe each of these measures.
Backward Inhibition (BI, Mayr and Keele, 2000), also referred
to as n-2 repetition cost (Koch et al., 2010), can only be assessed in
paradigms involving switching between three or more tasks. When
switching from Task A to Task B, Task A is thought to be inhibited.
In this case,Task A-related information was relevant in the past,but
now it is no longer relevant since Task B became relevant instead.
Therefore, switching back to task A following its recent inhibition
(A→B→A task sequence) should be more difficult than switching
to task A without its recent inhibition (e.g., following a C→B→A
task sequence) because of the residual active inhibition of Task
A. The relative difference between sequences ABA and CBA in
reaction time and/or accuracy is thought to reflect the degree to
which Task Set A was actively inhibited in the previous trial (Mayr
and Keele, 2000; Koch et al., 2010). As mentioned above, to date,
the only account of the n-2 repetition cost is based on inhibition
(Koch et al., 2010). Therefore, examining the influence of mindful-
ness practice on BI is especially revealing in this respect. Moreover,
BI indexes the inhibition of things that have been relevant in the
recent past, presumably making it possible to focus on the current
task. Thus, aside from being a pure measure of inhibition, unlike
most of the other measures that have been used thus far, the type
of inhibition tapped by BI (of previously relevant information) is
especially relevant to mindfulness, due to its emphasis on focusing
on the present moment.
Although, to our knowledge, the relation between BI and mind-
fulness practice has not been examined, we posit that it is likely
that the two are positively related. Our reasoning is twofold. First,
like BI, mindfulness has been claimed to involve inhibition of
thoughts and representations that were relevant in the past but are
no longer relevant (Bishop et al., 2004). Impairments in task set
inhibition (i.e., using no longer relevant task sets) may be taken
as a form of being “stuck in the past” rather than attending to
the present moment. A second reason for this assumed relation is
that both mindfulness (Ramel et al., 2004; Kingston et al., 2007;
Chambers et al., 2008; Heeren et al., 2009; Michalak et al., 2011;
Campbell et al., 2012) and BI (Whitmer and Banich, 2007; Whit-
mer and Gotlib, 2012) have been linked to reductions in depressive
rumination, thereby further implying a possible link between the
two phenomena.
The second measure which we examined is Competitor Rule
Suppression (CRS; Meiran et al., 2010, 2011b). In order to explain
CRS we must first explain the concept of a competing rule. A com-
peting rule is a rule that generates a response that competes with
the correct response. Take for example an experimental trial in
which the relevant task rule is Gender (requiring a male-female
decision) and indicating the right key as the correct response. Any
task rule (such as Hair Color) that would implicate the left key as
the correct response would thus be defined as “competing rule.”
Suppression, according to this postulation, is evident if the previ-
ously competing rule becomes the relevant one in the following
trial. Thus, CRS is computed by comparing performance (RT and
accuracy) on trials in which the current task rule was a competing
task rule in the previous trial with all other trial types, in which
the current task rule was not the competing one in the previous
trial (including trials in which another rule was competing). A
recent study by Hsieh et al. (2012) demonstrated that CRS is not
primarily accounted for by residual active inhibition of competing
rules. Instead, it seems to mostly reflect the tagging of currently
conflicting rules as rules that should not be processed when storing
the processing episode in memory. When the tagged rules become
relevant in the following trial, they are retrieved with the “do-not-
process” tag, thereby impairing performance. Thus, BI and CRS
differ in two aspects. While BI reflects residual active inhibition
that took place in the previous trial, CRS reflects “do-not-process”
tagging of currently competing rules. Thus, while Both BI and CRS
may be seen as phenomena promoting attendance to the present
moment, they do so in a different way, with the former involving
active inhibition, which has previously been linked to mindfulness
(e.g., Bishop et al., 2004), and the latter involving episodic memory
tagging of currently competing information.
The aim of the current paper was to examine whether mindful-
ness specifically improves inhibition of no longer relevant mind-
sets. If so, participants undergoing a mindfulness training program
should exhibit improved BI. If mindfulness practice involves tag-
ging of past information as irrelevant in episodic memory rather
than its inhibition, participants undergoing a mindfulness training
program should exhibit improved CRS but not improved BI. To
examine this issue, we compared two randomly assigned groups of
non-meditators: a group that underwent eight sessions of mindful-
ness training (“mindfulness”), and a “waiting list” group. Groups
were compared on a measure of BI and CRS both before and after
mindfulness training of the mindfulness group.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The participants and experimental design were those used by
Greenberg et al. (2012). Seventy six individuals with no former
meditation experience were recruited via poster ads hung around
Ben-Gurion University campus and email ads sent to all university
students, offering a free mindfulness program for those partic-
ipating in two experimental sessions. The program was due to
start in two possible dates several months apart. Exclusion criteria
included people with learning disabilities and non-native Hebrew
speakers, as well as people with previous meditation background.
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Following the first experimental session, participants were ran-
domly assigned to a Mindfulness meditation group (N = 38)
intended to participate in the first program and a waiting list
(control) group (N = 38) intended to participate in the second
program. No significant differences were found between groups
in Age [M = 25.45, SD= 2.56 for meditators, M = 26, SD= 2.5
for controls, t (74)= 0.95, ns], gender (13 male meditators, 15
male controls, p= 0.41, Fisher’s exact test), nor in academic abil-
ities as measured by self reported Psychometric Entrance Test
(PET) scores, the Israeli equivalent of the SAT scores [M = 662.97,
SD= 62.22 for meditators, M = 672.66, SD= 57.37 for controls,
t (74)= 0.70, ns]. The two groups were additionally equivalent
in ratings of happiness, sadness, and general mood [maximal
t (73)= 0.69, ns]. As measured by asking participants to rate their
current degree of happiness, sadness, and general mood on a 1–9
Likert scale. Emotion rating data were available for all but one par-
ticipant later assigned to the mindfulness group. The experiment
had received approval from the psychology department’s ethics
committee in Ben-Gurion University.
MEASURES
The CRS paradigms were similar to those used by Meiran et al.
(2010, 2011b). These paradigms have been demonstrated to pro-
duce both reliable BI and CRS effects. Two similarly structured
measures were administered before and after the mindfulness
group underwent the mindfulness program1. The experiments
were run on Pentium 4 computers with 17′′ (43.18-cm) monitors.
1Since participants were randomly assigned to groups, participants may be exam-
ined using only a post-test. Nevertheless, we had still decided to examine BI and
CRS at baseline level to further insure lack of differences at baseline level. Although
The procedures were programmed in E-Prime 2 (Psychological
Software Tools, Inc., 2005).
“Vertical Boxes” paradigm (pre-test)
This paradigm was used to assess equivalence between groups in
BI at baseline level, in Session 1, prior to the administration of the
mindfulness program. We had used a shorter and slightly modi-
fied version of the paradigm described in detail by Meiran et al.
(2011b). Each trial started with a presentation of a black screen for
500 ms, which served as a response-cue interval. A vertical array
of four boxes then appeared for 600 ms, with one of four possible
task related cues in its center, indicating which of four tasks is to be
performed. Following a screen displaying only the array of boxes
for 100 ms, a target stimulus (in the form of either a dot or line
colored in either red or green) then appeared in one of the four
boxes (see Figure 1). The four tasks were an “in-out” task in which
participants had to judge whether the target stimulus appeared in
the inner two boxes (“in”) or in the outer (top or bottom) boxes
(“out”), as well as tasks requiring judgment of color (red vs. green),
shape (dot vs. line), and vertical location of the target (i.e., upper
two boxes vs. lower two boxes). Participants had to press the “A”
key (on the left) if the target was “in,” green, a dot, or “up,” and
the “L” key (on the right) if the target was “out,” red, a line, or
“down,” respectively for the four tasks. A 400 Hz beep sounded in
case of an error in response. Due to the randomized controlled
study design, we decided not to counterbalance keys, in order to
assure standardization as much as possible.
similarly structured, the two paradigms are analyzed separately since they differed
in stimuli and tasks (which was chosen in order to avoid practice effects).
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of theVertical Boxes paradigm, based on Meiran et al. (2011a). (A) Schematic representation of the events in a trial, including cue
presentation, followed by target presentation; (B) the four target objects; (C) the cues for the four tasks.
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Participants received instructions introducing the tasks and
stimuli, and were instructed to use their index fingers, and respond
as quickly and accurately as possible. They then performed one
single-task block of 50 trials for each of the four tasks (in-out,
color, shape, and vertical location). Following this block, partici-
pants performed one practice block of 64 trials in which the four
tasks were randomly mixed, followed by seven experimental blocks
of 64 trials. At the end of each block, participants were instructed
to take a short break, stretch or walk around for a short while,
and continue when ready. One modification from the paradigm
used by Meiran et al. (2011b) was practicing each task separately
at the beginning of the experiment rather than gradually adding
tasks. This ensured equal experience with each task prior to mixing
the four tasks together. A second modification was a reduction in
the number of experimental blocks (7 instead of 18) in order to
shorten the length of the experiment. As mentioned above, keys
were not counterbalanced in order to increase standardization. A
final modification was in the cue for the Shape task, which was
modified from a square to a circle with a horizontal line run-
ning through it. Since the targets were either a circular dot or a
horizontal line, the cue was altered to better represent the targets.
“Faces” paradigm (post-test)
This paradigm was used to assess differences between groups in
Session 2, after the mindfulness group completed the mindfulness
program. This paradigm is a shorter and slightly modified version
of the one described in detail by Meiran et al. (2010). Modifica-
tions include practicing each task separately at the beginning of the
experiment, and using 7 rather than 18 experimental blocks, for
the reasons described above. The paradigm was identical in block
structure to the “vertical boxes” paradigm used in the first experi-
mental session with the exception that the cue was kept onscreen
until a response was given. However, the Faces paradigm involved
different stimuli, response keys, and mostly different tasks.
A 2× 2 array of boxes appeared onscreen with one of four pos-
sible task related cues in its center, indicating which of the four
tasks is to be performed. A target stimulus in the form of one
of four possible faces of young adults, two blonde and two dark-
haired, then appeared in one of the four boxes. The four tasks were
a horizontal location task, a hair color task, a gender task, and a
vertical location task (see Figure 2). Participants had to press the
“V” key (on the lower-left side) if the face target appeared in the
left column of boxes, if the hair was dark, if target was a face of
a male, and if it appeared in the bottom row of boxes, and press
the “U” key (on the upper-right side) if the face appeared on the
right column, if it was a face of a female, the hair was blonde, and
if it appeared in the top row of boxes, respectively for the four
tasks. A 400 Hz beep sounded in case of an error in response. As in
the “vertical boxes” paradigm, following instructions participants
performed one single-task block of 50 trials for each of the four
tasks (horizontal location,hair color,gender,and vertical location),
then performed a practice mixed-task block of 64 trials, followed
by seven experimental similar blocks. Blocks were separated by an
instruction to take a short break.
Self reported emotion ratings
Participants were asked to rate their degree of happiness, sadness,
and general emotional mood on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to
FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the Faces paradigm, based on Meiran et al. (2010). (A) Schematic representation of the events in a trial, including cue
presentation, followed by target presentation; (B) the four target objects; (C) the cues for the four tasks.
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9 in order to control for performance differences which may be
accounted for by mood.
MINDFULNESS PROGRAM
The program, based on Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy
(MBCT) program (Segal et al., 2002) with adaptations to include
handling everyday stress rather than only depression, is described
in detail by Greenberg et al. (2012). The program consisted of eight
meetings, held over 6 weeks. Seven meetings were 2 h long, and one
was a half day“retreat”which took place at the end of the fifth week.
The instructor was one of the authors (KR), a trained mindfulness
based meditation instructor having over 10 years of personal med-
itation experience. The instructor, who was blind to the hypothesis
of the experiment, guided participants through mindfulness med-
itation practices such as breathing meditation, body scan, open
awareness meditation, walking meditation, and compassion med-
itation, as well as through various awareness exercises, stories, and
group discussions. The program required at least 20 min of daily
home formal meditation practice. Participants received a daily
email notification directing them to an online diary for filling a
report of their daily home practice. Mean session attendance was
80%, and mean total practice time in the program was 19.65 h per
participant for those included in the main analysis.
DESIGN
A mixed design was used. Group (mindfulness vs. waiting list) was
the independent (between subject) variable, and the dependent
(within subject) variables were BI (i.e., DBA and CBA vs. ABA
trials) and CRS (i.e., trials in which the relevant rule was the inter-
fering rule in Trial n-1 vs. trials in which the relevant rule did not
interfere in Trial n-1).
PROCEDURE
Participants signed an informed consent form at the beginning of
each of the two experimental sessions. In Session 1, participants
performed the “vertical boxes” paradigm. They were then ran-
domly assigned to a waiting list and a mindfulness group, using
the “random” function in Python programming language. In Ses-
sion 2, which took place near the end of the mindfulness program,
participants performed the “faces” paradigm. Toward the end of
each session participants rated their mood using the self reported
emotion rating.
RESULTS
Since both BI and CRS occur only in the setting of switching
between tasks, we report here data from the seven experimen-
tal mixed-task blocks. Trials in which RT’s were lower than 100 ms
(anticipatory errors) and higher than 3500 ms (outliers) were elim-
inated (together 1.1% of the trials), as were the two trials following
an error or the two trials from the beginning of the block were elim-
inated, as required to assess BI (see Mayr and Keele, 2000; Meiran
et al., 2010, 2011a). Since different paradigms with different stim-
uli, response keys, and tasks were used in the two experimental
sessions, we did not analyze the results of the two paradigms in
a single analysis (with pre-post serving as a repeated measures
variable) and results from the two sessions are hereby reported
separately.
“VERTICAL BOXES” PARADIGM (PRE-TRAINING)
A three way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, with
Group (waiting list vs. mindfulness), BI (i.e., DBA and CBA vs.
ABA trials), and CRS (trials in which the relevant rule was the
interfering rule in Trial n-1 vs. trials in which the relevant rule did
not interfere in Trial n-1) as the independent variables, and RT
as the dependent variable. A significant main effect was found for
CRS, in which participants were overall slower on trials in which
the relevant rule was the interfering rule in the previous trial [F(1,
74)= 14.93, p< 0.001]. A just-significant interaction was found
between Group, BI, and CRS [F(1, 74)= 3.98, p= 0.05]. Planned
comparisons indicate that participants who were later assigned
to the mindfulness group exhibited a non-significant trend of
a greater BI effect in the non-CRS condition [F(1, 74)= 2.33,
ns], whereas those later assigned to the waiting list group exhib-
ited a similar trend in the CRS condition [F(1, 74)= 3.03, ns]. A
significant main effect was also found for BI [F(1, 74)= 24.38,
p< 0.001], indicating that participants were overall slower to
respond on BI trials than on control trials (i.e., ABA task sequence
vs. CBA or DBA task sequence). A similar ANOVA was conducted
with Error Rate as the dependent variable. A significant main effect
was found for CRS [F(1, 74)= 11.88,p< 0.001], indicating that in
addition to being slower,participants were also less accurate in CRS
trials. A marginally significant main effect was found for BI [F(1,
74)= 3.91, p= 0.05], indicating that overall, participants made
more errors in trials which did not require BI (i.e., CBA or DBA
task sequence) compared to trials which did require BI (i.e., ABA
task sequence). This indicates a tradeoff between speed and accu-
racy for both groups, in which participants were slower but more
accurate in BI trials. No other effects approached significance.
Importantly, no significant differences were found between
groups in BI nor CRS, which was true for both RT and error rates
[maximalF(1, 74)= 0.98,ns; means are listed in Table 1]. This lack
of differences in BI and CRS at baseline level remained, both in
RTs and Error Rates [maximal F(1, 63)= 1.47, ns] after excluding
participants who were excluded from analysis of the “faces” para-
digm (see Figure 3). Thus, groups were statistically equivalent in
BI and CRS at baseline level. Although participants in both groups
seemingly exhibited a BI effect in RT, the significant reversed BI
effect found in error rates indicates a speed-accuracy tradeoff. This
tradeoff seems to reflect a bias toward a slower and more accurate
performance strategy (see Wagenmakers et al., 2007) and suggests
that there was no evidence for a reliable BI in either group at
baseline level.
“FACES” PARADIGM (POST-TRAINING)
Data were unavailable from four participants from the waiting
list group and two from the mindfulness group who chose not to
participate in Session 2. Data were excluded from four other par-
ticipants from the mindfulness group who attended less than four
program meetings, and one participant from the waiting list group
who had her dominant hand in a cast following an injury between
the two experimental sessions. The main analysis was therefore
conducted on 32 participants from the mindfulness groups and
33 from the waiting list group.
A three way ANOVA was conducted on RT with the same inde-
pendent variables as above. A main effect was found for CRS
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Table 1 | BI and CRS means and SD’s (in parenthesis) at baseline level and after the mindfulness program.
BI RT BI error rate CRS RT CRS error rate
Non-BI BI Non-BI BI Non-CRS CRS Non-CRS CRS
Mindfulness group Session 1 825 (37) 853 (37) 0.053 (0.011) 0.047 (0.007) 823 (36) 855 (39) 0.046 (0.009) 0.054 (0.009)
Session 2 622 (33) 640 (32) 0.040 (0.009) 0.042 (0.009) 616 (31) 645 (35) 0.038 (0.009) 0.045 (0.009)
Waiting list Session 1 830 (37) 856 (37) 0.053 (0.011) 0.043 (0.006) 833 (36) 853 (39) 0.042 (0.009) 0.055 (0.009)
Session 2 660 (33) 679 (32) 0.0386 (0.009) 0.028 (0.009) 662 (30) 677 (35) 0.031 (0.009) 0.036 (0.009)
FIGURE 3 | BI RT’s and error rates at baseline level and after the
mindfulness program. Backward Inhibition (ABA task sequence
trials-CBA task sequence trials) according to Group in (A) RT in Session 1,
(B) Error Rate in Session 1, (C) RT in Session 2, and (D) Error Rate in
Session 2. The positive BI effect in RT (A) and negative BI effect in Error
Rate (B) suggest a speed-accuracy tradeoff, with no reliable BI effect at
baseline level. Although the waiting list group exhibited a similar trend and
tradeoff at Session 2, the mindfulness group exhibited a positive BI effect
in RT (C) and a positive BI trend in Error rate (D) thereby demonstrating a
reliable BI post-intervention. The asterisk indicates that the mindfulness
group exhibited a significantly greater BI effect in error rates than
controls (D).
[F(1, 63)= 12.80, p< 0.001], in which participants were over-
all slower on CRS trials. No significant interaction was found
between CRS and Group [F(1, 63)= 1.12, ns]. A main effect was
also found for BI [F(1, 63)= 12.31,p< 0.001], indicating that par-
ticipants were overall slower on BI trials. The interaction of Group
and BI was non-significant [F(1, 63)= 0.005, ns], indicating that
both groups were equally slower on trials which required BI (see
Figure 3; means are listed in Table 1). No other effects approached
significance.
A similar ANOVA was conducted with Error Rate as the
dependent variable. A significant main effect was found for CRS
[F(1, 63)= 6.51, p< 0.05], yet it was statistically comparable for
both groups, as indicated by the non-significant interaction [F(1,
63)= 0.65, ns]. No significant main effect was found for BI [F(1,
63)= 2.12, ns], yet the groups differed in BI, as indicated by the
significant Group X BI interaction [F(1, 63)= 4.39, p< 0.05; see
Figure 3]. Post hoc contrast comparisons reveal that while the
waiting list group had a higher error rate on control trials [CBA
and DBA;F(1, 63)= 6.41,p= 0.01], the mindfulness group exhib-
ited an opposite (non-significant) trend (see Figure 3; see Table 1
for means). This differential performance of the two groups in BI
error rates remained significant after adding BI and CRS error
rates from the “Vertical Boxes” paradigm as covariates to the
analysis in an Analysis of Covariance [ANCOVA; F(1, 61)= 4.06,
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p< 0.05]. Although no differences between groups were found in
self reported sadness,happiness,or general mood ratings following
the mindfulness program [maximal t (63)= 0.99,ns], these ratings
have been added as covariates in a separate ANCOVA examining a
similar error rate analysis. Differences between groups in BI error
rates remained significant in this case as well [F(1, 60)= 4.31,
p< 0.05].
In order to examine whether the mindfulness program altered
the way participants reacted to making an error or the tone played
when an error was made, post error slowing was calculated by sub-
tracting RT’s of trial in which the previous response was correct
from trials in which the previous response was an error. A t -test was
conducted comparing the groups in this measure indicated that
the two groups were equivalent in post error slowing [t (63)= 0.05,
ns], and therefore did not react differently to making in error or
the tone played.
In sum, with regards to CRS, both groups exhibited a reliable
effect in the two experimental sessions, yet did not differ between
them. With regards to BI, the waiting list group exhibited a similar
BI pattern in both experimental sessions, and adopted a strategy of
slower but more accurate performance on BI trials, with no indi-
cation of a reliable BI effect. In contrast, the mindfulness group
exhibited a different pattern of BI results in the two experimental
sessions. While their performance was similar to that of the wait-
ing list group at baseline level (i.e., BI effect in RT with a reversed
BI effect in error rates, which renders the RT-BI effects unreliable),
after the program they exhibited a reliable RT-BI effect with a sim-
ilar trend in error rates, without an indication of speed-accuracy
tradeoff. This indicates that mindfulness meditation resulted in
a clear and reliable RT-BI effect as opposed to an RT-BI effect
resulting from a speed-accuracy tradeoff (rather than processing
efficiency) that characterized the control group.
DISCUSSION
Mindfulness practice is said to be characterized by inhibition of
information not relevant to the present moment (e.g., Bishop
et al., 2004), and has been shown to reduce depressive rumination
(Ramel et al., 2004; Kingston et al., 2007; Chambers et al., 2008;
Heeren et al., 2009; Michalak et al., 2011; Campbell et al., 2012). BI
is considered to be one of the “purest” measures of task set inhibi-
tion (Koch et al., 2010), and impairments in it have been linked to
depressive rumination (Whitmer and Banich, 2007; Whitmer and
Gotlib, 2012). Given the fact that switching between tasks is a way
to operationalize switching between mindsets (Meiran, 2010), BI
indicates the ability to inhibit the mindset that had been adopted in
the recent past in favor of the currently relevant mindset. We there-
fore examined the hypothesis that mindfulness would improve
BI. Additionally, since many of the observed differences between
mindfulness practitioners and controls in measures assumed to
be related to inhibition (see Introduction) may be explained by
non-inhibitory accounts such as episodic memory retrieval (see
MacLeod et al., 2003; Koch et al., 2010) we also examined group
differences in CRS, which primarily taps the process in which
competing rules are tagged in episodic memory.
The two groups exhibited similar BI trends in Session 1. In fact,
both groups showed BI in RT but showed a significant reversed
trend in Error Rate. Thus, there was no clear indication for a
reliable BI effect in Session 1. Rather, the trend indicated a speed-
accuracy tradeoff. In Session 2, the control group continued to
show this trend of tradeoff. However, the mindfulness group
showed a reliable BI in RT and a similar trend in errors, indi-
cating a reliable BI effect without speed-accuracy tradeoff. Thus,
we conclude that mindfulness training improves BI.
While BI results differed between groups, CRS results did not.
This differential effect of the mindfulness program may shed some
light as to how mindfulness may promote attendance to the present
moment. Both BI and CRS may be seen as phenomena promoting
attendance to the present moment, yet do so via differential mech-
anisms. BI seems to conduce to attending to the present moment
by the active inhibition of information which was recently rele-
vant but is no longer so. With past information inhibited, one may
more easily notice and attend whatever currently arises. In con-
trast, CRS seems to conduce to attending to the present moment
by tagging in episodic memory of information which is currently
competing as“not to be responded to.” Results of the study suggest
that mindfulness improves the specific component of inhibition
of no longer relevant information rather than episodic memory
tagging of competing information.
Such improved inhibitory ability among mindfulness prac-
titioners seems of relevance to the use of mindfulness based
interventions in treatment of various clinical conditions, due to
the central role played by inhibition in many of these condi-
tions such as obsessive compulsive disorder (Enright and Beech,
1993), schizophrenia (Nestor and O’Donnell, 1998), and attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Barkley, 1997; Nigg, 2001). With
regards to cognitive aging, BI was found to be unimpaired in old
age (Mayr, 2001). The present findings provide support to the
notion that neurocognitive mechanisms involved in mindfulness
would not limit its efficacy in old age. This receives additional
support from findings that mindfulness is often found to be an
effective intervention in the elderly (see Lindberg, 2005; McBee,
2008). An additional contribution of the current results involves
the relation between mindfulness and rumination. Rumination
has been found to be one of the major risk factors in depression,
and typically consists of repeated thinking about one’s nega-
tive symptoms, their causes, and implications (Nolen-Hoeksema,
1991). One of primary aims of MBCT is to become aware of
such negative thinking patterns, and disengage from them, thereby
reducing the risk for a relapse in depression (Segal et al., 2002).
Albeit the currently available evidence indicating that mindful-
ness practice is related to reduced rumination (Ramel et al., 2004;
Kingston et al., 2007; Chambers et al., 2008; Heeren et al., 2009;
Michalak et al., 2011; Campbell et al., 2012), little if any empirical
evidence exists regarding how mindfulness does so. Impairments
to BI are assessed using different methods, and typically observed
in shorter time periods (Mayr and Keele, 2000) compared to
rumination. Nevertheless, both BI and rumination involve per-
severation of a particular mindset or way of thinking, and a
difficulty in moving on from information which is no longer
relevant. Both phenomena also often result in maladaptive reason-
ing or responding due to such difficulty in inhibition of previous
mindsets (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Mayr and Keele, 2000). Thus,
despite some differences between the two phenomena, the sim-
ilarities described above suggest that they may have a common
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base. By coupling the current finding that mindfulness improves
BI with previous findings suggesting that impairments to BI are
associated with trait depressive rumination (Whitmer and Banich,
2007; Whitmer and Gotlib, 2012), we tentatively suggest a mecha-
nism in which mindfulness may reduce rumination via increased
inhibition of no longer relevant information and task sets.
The rationale for our hypothesis that mindfulness may improve
BI was largely based on the fact that inhibition of no longer relevant
information may conduce to attending the present moment. One
may suggest that the finding that mindfulness training improves
BI may be taken as evidence to the contrary, that mindfulness
decreases rather than increases present moment awareness. This is
because BI entails lingering of inhibition from previous trials and,
in a way, reflects some “carrying over” of the past (i.e., the car-
rying over of inhibition). We posit, however, that such inhibition
conduces much more than it impairs attendance to the present
moment, as the lack of such inhibition often results in persever-
ation and getting “stuck” in no longer relevant mental sets (Mayr
and Keele, 2000). An additional point which we wish mention is
that since both groups were assessed prior to the mindfulness pro-
gram, we cannot rule out the possibility that mindfulness improves
BI only after such a pre-test, although this seems highly unlikely.
The speed-accuracy tradeoff observed in the current study was
not significantly observed by Meiran et al. (2010), who have used
a longer version of the Faces paradigm. One may interpret such
difference between studies in speed-accuracy tradeoff as potential
threats to validity and or reliability of BI findings in our study.
However, both studies have found significant and similar baseline
BI effects in RT (roughly 27 ms) thus providing evidence for valid-
ity in BI measurement in the current study. Moreover, Meiran et al.
found no BI effect in error rates (less than 0.001 in proportion of
errors, ns) meaning that approximately half of their participants
exhibited the same pattern of negative BI performance in error
rates as displayed by the sample in the current study. With regards
to the reliability of BI measurement, the fact that both groups in
the current study exhibited a qualitatively similar tradeoff at base-
line level, and that this finding was repeated by the control group at
Session 2 indicates that this finding in the absence of mindfulness
practice is reliable. In other words,our sample was slightly different
in its characteristics than that of Meiran et al. (2010), yet the sam-
ple was successfully divided by the random assignment into two
equivalent groups and the mindfulness intervention significantly
altered the BI pattern in the experimental group.
Comparing a randomly assigned mindfulness group with a
waiting list group may be taken as a limitation of the current
study, as it only enables us to attribute findings to the mindful-
ness intervention as a whole, rather than to specific components
within the intervention, as may have made possible by using an
active control group. In addition, although the relation between
BI and depressive rumination has been previously established
(Whitmer and Banich, 2007; Whitmer and Gotlib, 2012), we
did not measure rumination in the current study. Future stud-
ies may compare mindfulness with other intervention programs
to clarify the role of specific components in mindfulness inter-
ventions, and may also extend the use of this measure in various
forms of psychopathology in order to broaden our understand-
ing of the efficacy of mindfulness practice in treatment of these
conditions.
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